@article{oai:nfu.repo.nii.ac.jp:00001426,
 author = {楠田, 康之 and Kusuda, Yasuyuki},
 journal = {日本福祉大学経済論集},
 month = {Mar},
 note = {Developing the extensive game modeled by Ma and McGuire （1997）, this paper analyzes a long-term care insurance system wherein a care manager devises a care plan, and a care provider takes care of the beneficiary according to that plan. The care manager, as the first mover in the game, determines the quantity of care service for the beneficiary, while the provider, the follower, chooses the effort level of the care （or the "quality"） that is not contractible. In the principal-agent relationship, a moral hazard problem in terms of the effort of the provider might arise. This paper examines whether the insurance and reimbursement system can control the incentive of the agent to implement the socially optimal solution. Further, the paper introduces penalty systems by monitoring where the care manager monitors the benefit level provided by the provider ex post to resolve the moral hazard problem. The results show that the separation of care management and care provision might create some serious problems in this system.},
 pages = {1--16},
 title = {CARE MANAGER AND MORAL HAZARD IN LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE SYSTEM},
 volume = {46},
 year = {2013},
 yomi = {クスダ, ヤスユキ}
}